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Abstract. The application of formal methods to the railway domain
has a long-standing history within the academic community. Many ap-
proaches can provide both successful proofs of safety and, in the case
of failure, traces explaining the failure. However, if a given model does
produce a failure, it is difficult to understand the conditions that led to
the issue. We present a method to visualise railway safety issues to help
engineers and researchers explore the problem so that they can adjust
their designs accordingly. We evaluate our approach through qualitative
real-world case studies with researchers and railway engineers.
1 Introduction
Railway signalling represents an example of safety critical control systems. As
such, the use of rigorous development processes using formal methods has been
extensively studied by the academic community [15, 6, 14, 11, 24, 19, 13, 16, 20,
27, 1]. Such approaches involve automatically producing a mathematical proof
that the control system under consideration obeys certain rules regarding safety.
However, uptake of such methods by industry has been hindered by the chal-
lenges of: scalability (the proposed mathematical proof techniques do not scale
to large industrial examples); faithfulness (the models created fail to capture the
intricacies of modern railway signalling, which are often supplier dependent); and
usability (existing tools for formal analysis are not necessarily accessible to sig-
nalling engineers). In recent years, the formal methods community has proposed
solutions to scalability [25] and faithfulness [21]. However accessibility remains
an open challenge.
In this paper, we present a visualisation system for understanding safety is-
sues in scheme plans, specifically (1) a method to draw scheme plans that is useful
for railway engineers, supporting interoperability between toolsets; and (2) a dy-
namic visualisation technique to view key frames pertaining to safety issues in
context. We evaluate these approaches with railway engineers from Siemens Rail
UK and academics working in formal methods. The feedback provides evidence
that our algorithm for track layout is a useful way to improve tool interoper-
ability, whilst the evaluation of our visualisation approach for counterexamples
suggests that experienced users can quickly identify issues with designs.
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2 Related Work
In this section, we give a brief review of the field of formal methods and its
application to railways, before considering approaches to railway graph layout
and how they relate to our approach.
2.1 Railway Verification
Formal verification aims to provide a rigorous mathematical argument to show
that a system or design meets a given requirement. A typical application area for
formal methods is safety critical systems, of which railway control systems are
a clear example. Many approaches apply formal methods to railway safety veri-
fication [15, 6, 14, 11, 24, 19, 13, 12, 16, 20, 27, 1], with much of this work focusing
on the scientific development and application of results to examples in industry.
However, uptake of these results by industry is impeded by complex notations
and the heavy mathematical constructions that are involved [21].
Recently, there have been advances focusing on the accessibility of these
approaches. Specifically, toolsets that support domain specific languages [21,
17] and graphical specification development environments [22, 18] have allowed
railway engineers to model and verify systems in notations that are natural.
However, when a verification attempt fails, methods for presenting the reasons
for failure are lacking.
Another limitation with existing toolsets is that users are often required to
re-draw and re-enter railway layouts directly into the verification toolset when
geospatial information for track plans is unavailable. Re-entering data is clearly
cumbersome and time consuming, whilst importation of verification data tends
to be hard as geospatial information is often missing from the data.
In this paper, we address these points by adapting visualisation research
results to this area. In particular, we apply energy-based graph layout approaches
to automatically import and derive geospatial information for track plans. We
then utilize approaches to key frame visualisation in order to provide feedback
on failed verification attempts. We have incorporated these into the OnTrack
railway verification toolset [22] and have evaluated the work with end users.
2.2 Graph Layout for Railways
Railway track plans illustrate how various railway lines are connected at stations
and junctions, and can be interpreted (and drawn) as graphs. Such depictions are
natural for engineers working within the railway domain and can be of benefit
in visualising points of failure. However, they are less relevant with respect to
the correct functioning of the railway.
Existing approaches to drawing metro maps and network layouts [31, 30, 26,
7] provide possible methods for visualising track plans. Here, stations are placed
in the plane, with their spread-out geographic locations taken into account along-
side desirable æsthetic properties. For track plans, however, we deal with small
geospatial areas with complex network topologies; geospatial considerations are
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far less important to us, and in any case are typically unavailable (particularly
if the railway system has not been built).
In order to draw the track plan automatically, we use energy-based methods
for graph drawing [23, 8, 4]. These methods modify the graph locally using a
scoring function to determine if the layout has improved based on the selected
æsthetic criteria. Such methods have been used for general graph drawing but
have not been adapted for track layout. We create a method that optimises
for the desired properties of track plans, making drawings useful for domain
scientists and railway engineers.
2.3 Dynamic Data Visualisation
Visualising a railway safety issue – such as how two trains might collide – requires
a visualisation of the track plan and the trains that are moving on it. This is
a dynamic multivariate graph visualisation problem [5] where the attributes
(trains and point/signal states) are dynamic but the network topology remains
the same.
There has been significant work in the area of dynamic data visualisation.
In much of this work, animation is of benefit if it is a short animated transition
around a key event [29, 2]. Experimental results [3] have found that a “small
multiples” representation (visualising dynamic attributes as colour on a static
graph) can provide lower user response times with no significant difference in
error when compared to animation.
In the railway verification community, signalling engineers often step through
safety failures like mathematicians step through the lines of a proof. Our visuali-
sation must not only be perceptually effective, it must also support the cognitive
map with which railway engineers and formal methods researchers approach the
problem. We thus provide an interactive step-through approach, with support
for small multiples around key events.
3 Railway Visualisation Methods
In this section, we present our simulated annealing algorithm [8] for computing a
railway layout, followed by details concerning our counterexample visualisation
using key frames.
For our purposes, railway track plans are comprised of: track segments (TS );
and points, which may be left-facing (LFP) or right-facing (RFP), and whose
straight and offshoot tracks are designated as normal (N) or reverse (R), one of
each. (The specific purposes of these distinctions is unimportant for this paper.)
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A railway graph RG = (V,E) is an undirected graph where the vertices are
either track segments or points: V = TS ∪ LFP ∪ RFP. A track plan layout is
an assignment of two-dimensional positions (x, y) for all vertices in the railway
graph.
3.1 The Simulated Annealing Layout Algorithm
To establish a good layout for a track plan (i.e., such that it conforms with
validity criteria and is therefore understood by railway engineers), we employ a
simulated annealing algorithm [8]. This algorithm is given as follows:
`← initial (random) layout;
temp ← nodeCount(`); – – initial temperature
best ← `;
iter ← 0;
while temp > 0 do:
iter ← iter+1;
`← tweak(`, temp);





then best ← `;
if iter mod btemp∗cc = 0
then temp ← btemp∗dc
return best
Each point is initialised with a random type from the sets LFP and RFP (as
determined by the given data) to provide an initial layout. This layout is then
repeatedly tweaked in an effort to discover an optimal (best) layout.
There are three essential components to our algorithm: a temperature (temp);
a valuation function ν for rating layouts; and the tweak function.
• From an initial value (equal to the size of the graph), the temperature pa-
rameter is periodically reduced by a preset constant factor d ∈ (0, 1), and
the algorithm iterates until this temperature reaches zero.
• The valuation of a layout is penalised if:
– Node overlap: the distance between two distinct nodes is zero;
– Lack of gap: the x-coordinates x1 and x2 of two unconnected nodes are
too close, i.e., |x1 − x2| < 1;
– Long edges: the distance between two edges is greater than an ideal.
• The tweak function takes a layout and a temperature and produces a new
layout by making a series of random changes; each point in the graph may be
changed to another point of the same type (left/right-facing). The number
of such changes is dependent on the temperature, with higher temperatures
giving rise to more changes. Hence, tweaking becomes more subtle as the
algorithm progresses.
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There are two features of the algorithm worthy of comment:
1. The temperature is kept fixed for a number of iterations which is some preset
constant c> 0 times the temperature before being reduced. Thus, the number
of iterations carried out at a given temperature decreases exponentially with
the temperature.
2. There is randomness incorporated into the algorithm in that the layout may
be randomly replaced by a less-optimal layout; however, the likelihood of
this diminishes exponentially with the temperature and the poorness of the
layout compared to the currently-identified best.
Fig. 1 shows the results of applying our simulated annealing. The first layout
in the figure is the ideal layout, whilst the following three illustrate progressive
results. The unreadable labels are immaterial; all that is of interest is the layout.
For this run, we set the temperature decay d=0.75 and the iteration constant
c=3; and used the following penalties in scoring: each node overlap and lack
of gap is penalised −1; and each edge greater than 1 is penalised −10. As is
apparent, the algorithm effectively works from a poor layout towards ones close
to the ideal (though flipped vertically).
3.2 Verification: Insights from Failure
When verification tools discover a problem (such as the possibility of a crash),
they can evidence the problem by providing a sequence of events leading from
the initial configuration to the problematic state. However, being derived from
a proof tool, this sequence is often provided in a mathematical language that is
unnatural for signal engineers.
To overcome this, we have implemented an approach to visualising these
traces in the OnTrack toolset [22]. The last image in Fig. 2 shows one way to
depict a possible error state. Each step in the mathematical trace (i.e., each
event causing a system state change) is shown through highlighting the state of
the track plan elements. Users then have the option to step through each system
state leading to the error.
For short traces, this approach can be sufficient. However, counterexample
traces can easily become thousands of steps long with many of the steps being
superfluous to what is actually causing the problem. We have thus provided
users with a simple drop-down filter that allows them to select which types of
key frames to present, specifically frames that correspond to particular events
in the trace. For selection criteria, we include events from the generated trace.
These include events like “route set” or “point switched position”. Fig. 2 shows
an example of applying a filter that only shows “route set” events.
4 Expert Feedback
Four experts evaluated our tool and provided feedback (via interviews of ap-
proximately 30-45 minutes). Participants consisted of railway engineers working
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Fig. 1. Sample results from applying simulated annealing.
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as safety test engineers in industry (P1 and P4 ), and academics working on
applying formal methods to railways (P2 and P3 ). The participants were asked
to provide feedback on:
• The usefulness of the automatic layout when importing existing railway data.
Participants were given a demonstration of our simulated annealing approach
and example layouts. They were then asked to compare the automatic layouts
to existing practice and to rate the usefulness from 1 (not useful) to 5 (highly
useful) as a step towards the end goal of formal verification.
• The usefulness of the visualisation of counterexamples. Participants were
presented with a counterexample trace and a demonstration of key event
selection. They discussed the key events they would like to see and how
useful an approach it would be.
4.1 Importation of Data and Automated Layout
The participants working in academia were keen on the approach, with average
ratings: General usefulness 4; Usefulness as a starting point for re-drawing 3;
and Usefulness for verification 5.
Clear layouts take precedence over geography. P2 provides statements to
support this idea: “When verifying, you do not care too much about locations;
but having a clear representation helps a lot in identifying errors”. Similarly P3
noted: “I don’t really care about the physical reality of the situation as long as
I have the logic in place, that is perfect for me.” There is evidence that the
automatic layout would have an impact on work practices, with P2 noting the
approach would “save a lot of manual work” and P3 stating it is a “good way
to share benchmarks for verification without spending time encoding”.
However, P3 cautioned using automatic layout as a starting point for editing
as it may lead to human errors: “Human error may be a problem if the plan is
laid out automatically and doesn’t match the real-life model”. P2 noted that it
would be useful to “set a region as a ‘correct’ part of the plan before re-applying,
so that you eventually get a plan that corresponds to the real plan”. This indicates
that we should use actual geographic information when available.
The participants working within the railway industry on average rated au-
tomatic layout as follows: General usefulness 3; Usefulness as a starting point
for re-drawing 3.5; and Usefulness for verification 4. These participants noted
that the usefulness depends on company specific formats versus shared data. P4
noted: “It could be very useful for some things but not for others; If you don’t
have the original scheme plan, it would be very useful.”
P1 stated that the approach would be more useful if it provided affordances
for user steering or manipulation of the layout, particularly for point directions.
From these participants, it is clear that if we have existing track layout infor-
mation we should use it, but that the automatic layout tool can be useful when
this information is not present.
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Fig. 2. Presentation of an error trace using the “route set” filter. Green indicates a set
route, blue indicates occupation by a train, red an issue, here a “run through”.
Visualising Railway Safety Verification 9
4.2 Counterexample Visualisation
With respect to visualising counterexample traces, the feedback was positive.
Academics gave the following average ratings: General usefulness of step func-
tion 4.5; and Dynamic selection of key frames 4.5. Industry engineers gave the
following average ratings: General usefulness of step function 4.5; and Dynamic
selection of key frames 4.5.
P1 noted that the implemented visual approach was in line with their mental
model when performing a trace and would save time: “This is what I do now
but without the visual assistance, which would make it quicker”. All bar one par-
ticipant explicitly stated that they would like to have all counterexample steps
available as well as key frame selection. P3 stated: “I think you need both the full
trace and be able to jump between states; over simplification doesn’t always make
things easier”. Interestingly, participants agreed that key frames would be very
useful for experienced users, but a full trace would help for novice users. For ex-
ample, P2 noted: “I think it depends on experience: senior verification engineers
may identify problems using only a few key frames, but younger people may like
to see the full trace to help understanding”. P3 noted: “Advanced verification
experts could look at brief traces and likely detect problems”. All participants
also agreed that the most vital key frame would be “route setting” as described
by P4 : “Route setting will highlight where the error is in the control table.”
Participants suggested improvements, with three participants saying that
viewing detail in time around a particular key frame would be useful. P1 stated:
“It may be an option to have few of them, maybe 4-5 before and after an event”.
Similarly, P2 and P3 would like to see events within an area of a scheme plan,
with P3 stating: “I might like to see all steps within a particular section.”
5 Conclusion
We have presented a technique that increases the accessibility and usability of
formal methods within the railway verification community. Our solution con-
sists of two parts. Firstly, we apply simulated annealing to automatically lay out
railway graphs when no geographic information is available, improving interop-
erability between railway data sets. Secondly, we present key frame visualisations
to support the understanding of counterexamples as presented in the language
of the domain. Both approaches have been evaluated by expert users.
In future work, we would like to follow up on feedback from expert users
and use small multiples [28] to visualise details (i.e., nearby frames) around key
frames of interest. Similarly, we would like to explore the application of simulated
annealing within subgraphs of a railway graph. To this end, constraint-based
methods [9, 10] could be useful. Finally, we would like to perform more formal
evaluations of the railway layout algorithm through metric experiments as well
as user studies on realistic tasks that railway engineers are required to perform
on a regular basis.
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